Public spending patterns: the regional allocation of public investment in Greece by political period by Psycharis, Yannis
 All views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not  
necessarily represent the views of the Hellenic Observatory or the LSE 
 
© Yannis Psycharis 
 
 
 
 
Public Spending Patterns: the regional 
allocation of public investment in Greece by 
political period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yannis Psycharis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GreeSE Paper No 14 
 
Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe 
 
 
 
May 2008 
 
  
 
_
 
Table of Contents 
 
ABSTRACT _______________________________________________________ iii 
1. Introduction _______________________________________________________5 
2. The Geography of Public Finance in Greece: Data issues and sources ________6 
3. The Geography of Public Finance in Greece by political period_____________11 
3.1. Period 1976-1981, New Democracy party in power____________________12 
3.2. Period 1982-1989, Socialist party in power __________________________17 
3.3. Period 1990-1993, the return of New Democracy _____________________24 
3.4. Period 1994-2000, the return of Socialists___________________________30 
3.5. Period 2001-2004, the Olympic Games period________________________35 
4. Overview and conclusions ___________________________________________38 
References _________________________________________________________43 
Appendix___________________________________________________________45 
 
 
                                                 
Acknowledgements 
This paper was prepared at the Hellenic Observatory of the London School of 
Economics during my Fellowship as a National Bank of Greece Senior Research 
Fellow from September 2007 to February 2008. I am grateful to the staff of the 
Hellenic Observatory for the hospitality and the stimulating environment they offered 
during my fellowship at the LSE and especially to Dr. Vassilis Monastiriotis, for his 
valuable comments and discussions on previous versions of the paper. I greatly 
acknowledge the contributions of Evaggelos Kazazis and Panagiotis Pantazis for the 
statistical analysis and computational works that are presented in the paper. Of course, 
the usual disclaimer applies and all errors and omissions remain the responsibility of 
the author. 
 
  
 
 
Public Spending Patterns: the Regional Allocation of Public 
Investment in Greece by Political Period 
 
Yannis Psycharis# 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The spatial dispersion of public investment constitutes one of the 
principal elements and also one of the key issues concerning a 
country’s strategic regional development. Public investment 
expenditure represents in part the ‘social wage’ citizens receive, 
while at the same time it generates external economies for the 
productive sectors of the economy. Using a dataset that includes 
total outlays by all central, regional and local authorities, this paper 
traces the distribution of public investment in Greek prefectures 
(NUTS 3) over the period 1976-2005. It seeks to highlight the 
spending pattern governments of that period had followed, to 
compare the changes (if any) between different periods, and to 
explain whether redistribution of national wealth or other factors, 
including political ones, could be contributing to explaining the 
pattern and its temporal changes. 
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Public Spending Patterns: the regional allocation of public 
investment in Greece by political period 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years the geography of public investment has gained renewed 
attention. Public investment affects the regional economy in two ways. The 
first is the short-run effect; an increase in public investment directly and 
indirectly stimulates economic growth. The second is the long-run effect; 
public investment creates public capital which provides the economy and 
society with the necessary infrastructure and upgrades both the social well-
being and the development potential of the territories. Classical writers 
(Buchanan, 1949, 1950, 1952; Scott, 1952; Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972, 
1998; Samuelson, 1954; Tiebout, 1956; Hirschman, 1957) and more recent 
advances in empirical work have given prominent position to the role of public 
investment in economic development (Bennett, 1980; Heald, 1994; Aschawer, 
1989). This is why the geographical dispersion of public investment has taken 
on a renewed political salience for many governments in the contemporary 
public policy debate (Heald and Short, 2002:714).   
This paper examines the regional distribution of public investment in Greece 
during a 30-year period, starting from 1976 and ending to 2005. In the course 
of this period the volume of public investment has increased in current prices 
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by 63 times.1 However, at constant prices, increases were much less intense; in 
the year 2005, the volume of public investment was 1.7 times higher than that 
of the year 1976, whereas the year 2004 was 2.3 higher in comparison to the 
year 1976. It is also worth noting that the Public Investment Budget as a 
percentage of GDP fluctuated around 4% for the period 1976-1997, and 
between 5-6% for the period 1997-2005. 
The key objective of the paper is to address comprehensively the regional 
funding patterns of different governments of the period 1976-2005 and also to 
consider some plausible explanations for such changes. Despite some earlier 
work on public investment expenditure in Greece (Psycharis, 1990, 1993, 2000, 
2004; Lambrinidis et al.,1998; Rovolis, 1999; Lambrinidis et al., 2005; 
Mpistikas, 1985; Petrakos and Psycharis, 2004; Psycharis and Georgantas, 
2004, Psycharis and Monastiriotis, 2007), this is the first time that the regional 
distribution of Greek public investment is examined in such detail and for such 
a long time-period.  
 
2. Geography of Public Finance in Greece: Data issues and sources 
Research into the geography of public finance is not at all a straightforward 
issue. There are tremendous methodological problems when the scale of 
analysis is changing from the national to a sub-national level. Decisions over a 
number of issues are of crucial importance for the foundation and limitations of 
                                                 
1
 In 2004, the year of the Athens Olympic Games, public investment volume reached its historical 
highest level which was 80 times higher than that of the year 1976. 
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the analysis. Problems involved include, among others, decisions over the 
determination of the periods, the geographical scale of analysis and on 
manipulation of statistical data.  
Choice of one period of time rather than another is of course arbitrary and 
occasionally confounding issue. Different periods emerge when the analysis is 
based on economic cycles rather than on political cycles. Hence, decisions over 
periods are usually determined by the purpose of the analysis. This also has 
some limitations. Trends on public spending, per example, that have been 
observed in one period might have started before the period under study. 
Another problem is related to the availability of data at the disaggregated 
geographical levels since usually only a part of the expenditure has a specific 
geographical orientation. A large amount of public spending remains 
unallocated, yet this unallocated amount is not at all geographically neutral. 
Furthermore, even in cases of geographically identifiable expenditure it is 
questionable whether these increments ‘in’ the geographical boundary of the 
prefectures are also ‘in and for’ the prefectures. 
Concerning the measurement issues it is quite different to construct a 
geographical pattern of public expenditure based on the volume of public 
spending rather than on the per capita payments. The later is the most 
commonly used measure in order to make comparisons. As we will discuss 
later this also has some limitations. As regards public investment there is also 
another issue which is related to what we really measure. The evolution of the 
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gross amount of public investment is an analysis of flows, whereas the 
accumulation of public capital is an analysis of capital formation.     
Finally, the coverage and content of public investment in the course of a 30-
year period is gradually changing and different types of payments have been 
included in the public investment budget whereas other types have been 
removed. These changes impact on the regional distribution to the extent that 
the location of benefits of new programmes (e.g. Life-long learning) is different 
from that of the beneficiaries of discontinued programmes (Border regions 
support programmes). 
Our analysis focuses on Greece during the period 1976-2005. Greece covers an 
area of 132,000 km2, has a population of 11,961,758 inhabitants and is divided 
into 51 prefectures (in Greek, nomos). Greek prefectures correspond to the 
level III of the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) of 
EUROSTAT, the Statistical Office of the European Union. The average surface 
of a representative prefecture is 2,587 km2 (range from 356 km2 to 5461 km2). 
Prefecture is a key feature of the Greek political, administrative and planning 
structure and also the base unit for constituencies, with the exception of Attiki 
and Thessalοniki, which contain five and two constituences each respectively. 
In addition, prefectures had been, and to a very large extent still are, the spatial 
level on which the attention of regional development policy has been focused 
for many years. Regions which today play an important role in regional policy 
didn’t exist until 1986; they were legislated for in that year, but they didn’t 
become fully functional until after 1997.  
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Developing such a comprehensive analysis requires access to data sources 
different from the conventional ones (see Appendix). The starting point of our 
analysis was the payments made through the State Investment Programme. The 
Greek Public Investment Programme (PIP) is part of the Greek Annual Budget; 
it forms a very important constituent of the State Budget and, of course, is 
approved by the Parliament. PIP is the main mechanism for providing the 
Greek economy with infrastructure, and it also encompasses the structural 
funding from the European Union.  
Data that are used in this study include all payments realised by different tiers 
of public administration; the national (ministerial) level, the regional, the 
prefectural, and the local. Such data include public investment in infrastructure 
for the economy’s primary and secondary sectors, payments for infrastructure 
in the form of roads, bridges, ports, airports and tourist facilities, urban 
infrastructure (primarily water and sewage facilities and housing), social 
infrastructure (education and health), etc. To obtain a measure of public 
investment at constant prices, sectoral deflators were used for the different 
categories of infrastructure investment. All variables are expressed in EURO 
and at constant 2000 prices. For every variable there are 1650 observations, 
fifty-one cross-section observations per year. 
The assignment of public investment to different prefectures is not at all a 
straightforward issue. Regionally allocated public investment accounted for 
some 55% of total public investment in the study period. The remaining 45% 
remains unallocated and could not be assigned to specific prefecture (for the 
UK experiences see also Heald and Short, 2002:749; Cameron et. al., 2004). 
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This includes inter-regional projects or projects that affect the entire population 
of the country. The current study is based only on the regionally allocated part 
of the expenditure (regionally identifiable or regionally relevant expenditure).  
The analysis presented below is carried out in sub-periods, each determined by 
the duration of each government in power. These sub-periods are: 1976-81, 
1982-89, 1990-93, 1994-2000 and 2000-2004 (see Table 1).  
These periods coincide with particular parties’ terms in government. Thus, 
Period I 1976-1981, the ‘New Democracy’ (ND) party, the Conservative Party, 
was responsible for the country’s government. This was also the period of 
restoration of democracy after the falling of the dictatorship in 1974. The next 
period begins in 1982 and covers the period 1982-89. This determines the 
‘Socialists’ Era’. During this period, the ‘Panhellenic Socialist Movement’ 
(PASOK) was responsible for the country’s government (1981-85, 1985-89). 
Over the period 1989 to 1990 Greece was governed by three short-lived 
governments with limited mandates, one of a coalition between the 
conservative party of New Democracy and the Left, one caretaker government, 
and one ‘national unity’ government in which New Democracy shared power 
with both PASOK and the Left. In 1990, the ND party won the elections and 
formed a government. Only from the middle of 1990 through 1993 was the 
conservative party of New Democracy alone in power but, again, its extremely 
weak parliamentary majority (of one vote) formed a decisive obstacle to the 
implementation of policy choices. Internal conflicts within the party led to the 
collapse of the ND government and a victory in the 1993 elections for PASOK, 
who also won the 1996 and 2000 elections, returning to power and remaining 
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in power for the entire period 1993-2004 (1993-96, 1996-00, 2000-04). Finally, 
the ND party won the 2004 elections and returned to power, remaining in office 
for a second term after the 2007 elections. 
Table 1: Periodising of the Post-dictatorial Greek Governments 
Period Governing party 
1974-1977  New Democracy (Conservatives) 
1977-1981 New Democracy (Conservatives) 
1981-1985 PASOK (Socialists)  
1985-1989 PASOK (Socialists) 
1989 Coalition government - Conservative Party and the Left 
1989 Caretaker government  
1989-1990  National unity government  
1990-1993 New Democracy (Conservatives) 
1993-2006 PASOK (Socialists) 
1996-2000 PASOK (Socialists) 
2000-2004 PASOK (Socialists) 
2004-2007 New Democracy (Conservatives) 
2007- New Democracy (Conservatives) 
Source: Own representation. 
 
Following this introduction, the regional variations in public spending pattern 
for these periods are presented with an examination of some reasons for these 
variations. Then, a presentation of summary statistics summarises the 
persistence and changes of the pattern over time. The final section concludes. 
 
3. The Geography of Public Finance in Greece by political period 
At the outset it is important to emphasize that the most common ranking on regional 
spending pattern is constructed according to distribution of per capita public 
expenditure (i.e. Heald, 1994; McLean and McMillan, 2003). Regional comparisons 
of total spending are meaningless unless a suitable measure is introduced. As Short 
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(1978:502) states ‘...population would appear to be the most suitable overall yardstick 
… since public expenditure as a whole is related to the needs of people’. However, as 
Anton (2000:431-2) argues ‘… it is too easy to over-interpret per-person expenditure 
information… because even relatively small sum can appear large when divided by 
tiny population. Conversely, more populous states receive very large amounts but, 
because those expenditures are divided by much larger populations, the data 
consistently show below-average receipts’. In this paper the principal ranking is based 
on per capita values. However, the magnitude of public spending is also included in 
the analysis as well as GDP per capita as ‘another prima facie indicator of regional 
needs’ (McLean and McMillan, 2003:48). 
 
3.1. Period 1976-1981, New Democracy party in power2 
In this section stylised facts that have resulted from the analysis are presented 
in the Table Ia in the Appendix. The analysis is carried out using average 
public investment expenditure by period. The first columns of this Table shows 
per capita distribution of regionally allocated public investment over the period 
1976-1981. From the bottom line of the Table it can be seen that the regionally 
allocated public investment per capita over the period 1976-1981 averaged 
€191.95. The unallocated amount per capita of that period was €163.3. The 
total average public investment per capita was €355.3. What is presented 
below, however, is only the regionally allocated part of public investment.  
                                                 
2
 The first elected post dictatorial government was under Konstantinos Karamanlis (1974-1977) who 
also won the 1977 elections and remained Prime Minister until 10/5/1980, when he was elected 
President of the Hellenic Republic. Georgios Rallis replaced him as Prime Minister until 21/10/1981. 
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Table Ia shows per capita public investment for the top-10 / bottom-10 
prefectures compared to the national average. As can be depicted from that 
table there are significant regional variations in the distribution of public 
investment across Greek prefectures ranking from €467.82 for Evros to €85.02 
for Trikala. More specifically, Evros, the North-East boarder prefecture of 
Greece, with €467.82 public investment per capita is ranked first, receiving 
public investment two and a half times the country average. Conversely, 
Trikala, an agricultural prefecture of western Thessaly, with €85.02 public 
investment per capita is ranked last, with public investment less than half of the 
country average. The max/min ratio between the ‘most benefited’ and the ‘least 
benefited’ prefecture is 5.5 (Table 7). During this period 23 prefectures receive 
shares above the country average, and 27 prefectures receive shares below it.  
Starting from the ‘most advantaged’ prefectures, it can be seen that the 
mountainous prefecture of Evrytania, which received on average €388.80 
public investment per capita, holds the second place in the relative ranking. The 
agricultural prefecture of Serres, with €387.62 public investment per capita, 
holds the third position in the ranking. Both prefectures had received twice as 
much as the country average. The agricultural prefecture of Ileia, with €357.11 
public investment per capita, holds the 4th place and Ioannina, a prefecture in 
the region of Epirus (the least well-off region of the country), with €294.48 
public investment per capita, holds the 5th place in the ranking. The other five 
places are held by Voiotia, an industrial prefecture adjacent to Attiki, Pella, 
which is the industrial prefecture adjacent to Thessaloniki, the mountainous 
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prefecture of Grevena, the prefecture of Preveza and the Prefecture of Samos 
Island. All these were the top ten ‘beneficiaries’ of that period.  
At the other end of the spectrum, there are the prefectures with public 
investment per capita well below the national average. As stated above, the 
prefecture of Trikala, which received €85.02 public investment per capita, held 
the lowest place. The prefecture of Larisa, with €94.79 public investment per 
capita, held the 50th and thus second worst place in the ranking. The 
mountainous prefecture of Kozani, with €98.82 public investment per capita, 
held the 49th place, third from bottom in the ranking. The agricultural 
prefecture of Karditsa, with €100.17 public investment per capita, held the 48th 
place. The prefecture of Fthiotoda, with €101.25, held the 47th place. The 
prefectures of Imathia, Pieria, Kerkyra, Arta, and Evoia held the bottom ten 
places in the ranking. All of these ten prefectures received public investment 
around and below 50% of the national average and were the net ‘losers’ of that 
period. 
Apart from examining the extreme cases it is worth having a closer look at the 
prefectures of Attiki and Thessaloniki. These two prefectures include the 
largest urban agglomerations in Greece, Athens and Thessaloniki. Attiki, which 
holds Athens, the capital of Greece, receives the lion’s share of public 
investment at nominal values (37,6% of the total), but in per capita terms this 
prefecture is receiving only 10% above the national average and is holding the 
seventeenth position in the relevant ranking. Thessaloniki, with per capita 
public investment 27% below the national average, holds the thirty-fifth 
position in the ranking. 
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All of this raises a number of questions. Let us examine two of them. Firstly, is 
there any clear pattern for the regional allocation of public investment during 
this period? The answer in general is no. No more than a quick glance at the 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ lists doesn’t seem to reveal any ‘clear’ geographical 
pattern emerging so far. The geography of public investment is rather ‘patchy’.  
Secondly, are there any reasons explaining the relative distribution of public 
investment during this period? This question cannot be answered without 
conducting extended work. However, one plausible explanation is that the 
regional distribution of public investment had been dictated by redistribution of 
national wealth in favour of the prefectures with higher ‘needs’. Some 
economists believe that distributional issues should form an integral part of the 
public sector spending schemes. If this had been the case, one would expect to 
see a negative correlation between the level of economic development 
(expressed by GDP per capita) and the public support that prefectures received 
(expressed by public investment per capita). The coefficient correlation 
between GDP per capita and public investment per capita is presented in Fig.1. 
When regional GDP per capita in 1976 is plotted against public investment per 
capita for the period 1976-81, it seems there is a small negative relationship 
between the values under study –the slope of the curve shows a relatively small 
negative gradient– which, however, is not statistically significant, and thus no 
substantial redistributive effect can be proved. This result, however, has been 
influenced by outliers; such is the case of Voiotia in the upper right quadrant 
and Evros in the top left quadrant of the Figure. Even when outliers are 
excluded still redistribution cannot carry sufficient evidence of geographical 
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redistribution. Conversely, as it is depicted from the bottom left quadrant, in a 
large number of cases, prefectures lagging behind in economic development 
were also lagging in public investment expenditure support. 
Figure 1. Scatter-plot of per capita public investment (1976-81) and GDP (1976) 
for Greek prefectures (Greece=100) 
 
Source: Own elaboration of Regional Accounts of National Statistical Service of 
Greece and Public Investment of Greek Ministry of Economics and Finance. 
 
As a general conclusion to the preceding analysis, it could be said that the 
Conservative governments of that period followed a pattern with a principal 
aim to directing public investment to the country’s industrial poles, such as 
Voiotia, the adjacent to Attiki industrial ‘satelite’, and Pella, the adjacent to 
Thessaloniki industrial ‘centre’ being given priority, and the selective support 
of particular areas such as Evros (a special circumstances border prefecture), 
Evrytania (a mountainous and one of the least developed prefectures), as well 
as certain agricultural areas such as Serres (which was the place of origin for 
the country’s Prime Minister K. Karamanlis) and Ileia (the place of origin of 
the Minister of Economics Ath. Kanellopoulos). However, the level of under-
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development does not seem to have comprised a fundamental factor for the 
regional distribution of public investment in the period 1976-81. Attiki received 
the bulk of public investment in nominal terms and above the average in per 
capita terms. Let us not forget however, that during the 1970s Athens’ rate of 
expansion was particularly high, and as a consequence urban development 
problems took on a sense of urgency and their resolution demanded substantial 
infrastructures, something which policy could not ignore. 
 
3.2. Period 1982-1989, Socialist party in power3 
This period was characterised by the following two elements. Firstly, it was a 
period when successive PASOK governments were ruling the country (1981-
85, 1985-89). Secondly, structural funding from the European Economic 
Community, which Greece joined in 1981, strengthened the financing of public 
investment. 
In 1981 a political change came about in Greece when the Socialists won the 
elections and remained in power almost throughout the decade. In this section 
the degree to which the Socialists’ governments reset the geographical 
priorities for public investment provision and therefore causing a reshuffling of 
the ranking compared to the previous period will be investigated.  
                                                 
3
 The year 1981 was a turning point in Greek politics since PASOK won the elections and formed the 
first socialist government. Period 1981-1989 constitutes the ‘Socialists Era’ under Prime Minister 
Andreas Papandreou with two consecutive terms in power 1981-1985 and 1985-1989. 
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As can be seen (Table Ib, Appendix), regionally allocated public investment 
per capita over the period 1982-1989 averaged €212.73 compared to €191.95 of 
the previous period 1976-1981.4 Thus, the socialist governments followed a 
more expansionary fiscal policy in the 1980s compare to the fiscal policy of the 
1970s. What were the geographical consequences of this expansionary fiscal 
policy?  
Firstly, public investment increased in most prefectures. However, important 
variations still existed between different prefectures, ranking from €714.37 in 
Evritania to €135.50 in Ileia, with a max/min ratio of 5.2. Evrytania stands first 
in ranking with €714.37 per capita over the period 1982-1989, enjoying support 
4.2 times higher than the country average. Kefallinia with €553.59 holds the 
second position in the ranking and is enjoying 2.6 times higher support than the 
country average. The same applies to Voiotia which with €491.11 public 
investment per capita holds the third place in the ranking and is receiving 
support 2.3 times above the country average. Rethymni with €454.6 and Evros 
with €426.4 public investment per capita are holding the forth and fifth places 
in the ranking respectively. These two ‘beneficiaries’ receive support twice as 
much as the country average. In total 34 out of 51 prefectures receive support 
above the country average.5 The least favoured prefectures received support 
only 36% below the country average in comparison to the 46% of the previous 
period. The vast majority of prefectures were finally benefited from the 
distribution of national wealth. However, the disparity between the most 
                                                 
4
 The unallocated amount per capita of that period was €180.90. The total average public investment 
per capita was €393.70. 
5
 During the previous period only 20 out of 51 prefectures received support above the country average. 
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benefited and the least benefited prefectures became more intense! The 
standard deviation index for that period is 116.4 compared to 83.3 for the 
previous one. This might sound as a paradox but it is due to the fact that the 
more benefited prefectures got disproportionably higher support than the less 
benefited. As a result the gap between the most benefited and the least 
benefited was increased.  
Perhaps the most striking of the several conclusions that can be derived is the 
relative change in regional rankings across the two periods. Rank order 
correlation as high as .546 makes clear that significant changes came about 
over the period 1982-1989 in comparison to the 1976-1981, causing an 
important reshuffling for the relative position each prefecture holds in the new 
ranking. In order to trace these changes the transition matrix analysis has been 
applied. Transition matrix is a very commonly used technique to highlight 
changes in the rank order and to pinpoint precisely the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, 
the prefectures that got disproportional higher amounts and were upgraded in 
the relative climax and vice versa. As the transition matrix table indicates only 
20 out of 51 prefectures stayed at the same quartile for both periods. Of the 31 
movers, 13 were downgraded and 18 were upgraded. Figure 2 shows these 
transitions while Table 2 reports the extreme cases of prefectures that were 
upgraded or downgraded during this period.  
Starting from the prefectures that dropped down in terms of investment 
allocation, incontrovertibly, the most dramatic case is Ileia, which from the 4th 
position it held in the 1976-81 period, was downgraded to the last (51st) place 
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in the respective ranking for the 1982-89 period. This severe drop is the most 
extreme case.  
Figure 2. Transition Matrix-Changes in the pattern of public investment 
allocation: 1982-89 versus 1976-81 (ranking quartiles) 
1982-89 (column) 1976-81 
(row) 42-51 32-41 22-31 12-21 1-11 Total 
42-51 4 3 3   10 
32-41 2 4 3 1  10 
22-31 1 3 1 4 1 10 
12-21 1  2 4 3 10 
1-11 2  1 1 7 11 
Total 10 10 10 10 11 51 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
Table 2. Changes in ranking for public investment allocation between 1976-81 
and 1982-89: a selection of extreme cases 
 NUTS III 1976-81 1982-89  
   R GR=100  R GR=100 diff 
gr233 Ileia 357,11 4 186 135,50 51 64 -47 
gr126 Serres 387,62 3 202 155,72 46 73 -43 
gr3 Attiki 211,79 16 110 174,86 43 82 -27 
gr122 Thessaloniki 169,69 27 88 148,04 47 70 -20 
gr124 Pella 282,05 7 147 243,42 26 114 -19 
gr251 Argolida 203,24 19 106 221,18 31 104 -12 
gr253 Korinthia 125,57 38 65 138,48 50 65 -12 
gr231 Aitoloakarnania 179,56 24 94 204,39 35 96 -11 
gr112 Xanthi 171,13 26 89 203,40 36 96 -10 
N
eg
a
tiv
e 
gr143 Magnisia 139,75 34 73 175,21 42 82 -8 
gr431 Irakleio 125,96 37 66 233,37 28 110 9 
gr133 Kozani 98,82 49 51 181,98 39 86 10 
gr144 Trikala 85,02 51 44 175,23 41 82 10 
gr245 Fokida 190,14 22 99 343,65 12 162 10 
gr242 Evvoia 115,05 42 60 227,65 30 107 12 
gr132 Kastoria 135,00 36 70 271,85 23 128 13 
gr114 Drama 137,08 35 71 276,51 21 130 14 
gr211 Arta 113,28 43 59 251,58 24 118 19 
gr141 Karditsa 100,17 48 52 250,89 25 118 23 
Po
sit
iv
e 
gr433 Rethymni 158,77 31 83 454,61 4 214 27 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
Another striking revelation portrayed in these data is Serres which from 3rd 
place in the period 1976-81, fell to 46th in the period 1982-89, and downgraded 
by 43 places. These two prefectures moved from the highest quartile to the 
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lowest. Both used to be among the beneficiaries of the previous period. Attiki 
fell from 16th place to 43rd, i.e. it dropped 27 places. Thessaloniki drifted 
further from the 27th place to the 47th, a drop of 20 places. Finally, the fall in 
rankings of some other prefectures is also impressive. This is mainly the case 
for Pella (from 7th to 26th), Argolida (from 19th to 31st), Korinthia (from 38th to 
50th), Aitoloakarnania (from 24th to 35th) and Xanthi (from 26th to 36th). 
Conversely, there are other prefectures that have improved their position in the 
ranking. Here the most impressive case is that of Rethymni, which from the 
31st position in the 1976-81 ranking rose to 4th in the period 1982-89, changing 
its relative ranking by 27 positions. The transition Karditsa experienced, from 
48th to 25th place, i.e. a difference of 23 places, was also impressive. In 
development terms, this agricultural prefecture was lagging behind by 20% 
below the national average in the year 1982. This is not the case for Rethymni, 
which showed a level of development above the national average. However, 
this prefecture had among the highest proportions of PASOK voters in the 
country (51.5% in 1981 and and 57.2% in 1985, the highest percentage PASOK 
got in any constituency). This perhaps offers an explanation for the observed 
change. Arta also experienced a substantial upgrading, by 19 places, from 43rd 
position to 24th. Clearly this prefecture required a boost since its level of 
development was 25% below the national average; though the fact that it was 
the constituency and the place of origin of D. Tsovolas, who served for an 
extended time as Minister of Economics for the governments of this period, 
should not be unnoticed. Kefallinia, which holds the second place in the 
ranking and was upgraded by 11 places, was the place of origin for G. Arsenis 
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who served as Minister of National Economy for many years in the Socialists’ 
governments of that period. Several studies of the determinants of public 
spending have found strong indication that modern transfer spending tends to 
be a function of (geographic) political clout rather than ‘need’ (Anderson and 
Tollison, 1991:162). Such discretionary policy has been studied in many other 
cases in the relative literature and more extended commentary seems warranted 
for the Greek case. 
Apart from these cases, certain other prefectures also show important changes. 
These are the following: Drama rose by 14 positions, from 35th to 21st, Kastoria 
by 13, from 36th to 23rd, Evvoia by 12, from 42nd to 30th, Fokida (from 22nd to 
12th), Trikala (from 51st to 41st), and Kozani (from 49th to 39th) by 10 and 
Irakleio by 9 (from 37th to 28th). 
On closer inspection, it can be observed that these transitions have a particular 
geographical reference. The agricultural prefectures of Thessalia, that were 
neglected the previous period, the majority of the insular prefectures and 
certain border prefectures, were upgraded. All Kriti’s prefectures rose 
significantly in the rankings, as well as the prefectures of Keffalinia, Zakynthos 
and Kastoria. On the contrary, Attiki and Thessaloniki lost public investment. 
Attiki’s share in absolute terms was reduced to 28.5% from 37.6% of the 
previous period. Many of the beneficiaries of the previous period, such as 
Serres, Pella, Chalkidiki, Ileia, Argolida, all the prefectures of Western Greece 
(apart from Achaia), as well as Evros, also lost public investment.  
  23 
In looking for an overall pattern, one might expect that the lower the level of 
prosperity, in terms of GDP per capita, the higher the level of public investment 
per capita. Was this system more redistributive when compared with that of the 
previous period? As Figure 3 shows, although the redistributive curve 
possesses a negative slope greater than that of the previous period, this slope 
again is not particularly steep. Hence, redistribution is not on its own a 
sufficient determinant to explain the reasoning behind the regional distribution 
of public investments during the period under study. 
Figure 3. Scatter-plot of per capita public investment (1982-89) and GDP (1982) 
for Greek prefectures (Greece=100)   
 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
The general conclusion is that again in the period 1982-89, a specific 
geographical pattern of public investment is not emerging. There is not a clear 
‘North-South divide’, nor an ‘Athens and rest of country’ divide. Neither ‘low 
density’ nor ‘low income’ seems to carry sufficient explanatory capacity. As in 
the previous period, there is not again a clear geographical pattern for the 
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distribution of public investment. It seems, however, that important changes 
have take place in the spatial distribution of public investment, compared with 
the preceding period. Public spending increased as well as redistribution. The 
redistribution had also some ‘clear’ exceptions which were the beneficiaries of 
the previous period. The ‘biased’ distribution of funds cannot be examined 
further in this paper. Indeed, these results are so interesting, and the issue so 
significant from a political point of view, that it deserves further investigation 
something that goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
3.3. Period 1990-1993, the return of New Democracy6 
The political instability of the two-year period 1989-90 and the return to power 
of New Democracy party (1990-93) comprise this period’s political 
characteristics. Another feature of this period is that public investment 
incorporated the European Funding form the 1st Community Support 
Framework (CSF) of 1989-93. 
Fundamental changes should not be expected during the course of four-year 
period. However, as Table 1C shows the regionally allocated per capita public 
investment dropped from €212.73 of the previous period to €200.36.7 This 
                                                 
6
 Over the period 1989-90 Greece was governed by three short - lived governments. The coalition 
government between New Democracy and the Left under Tzannis Tzannetakis (form July 2, 1989 to 
October 12, 1989), the caretaker government under Yiannis Grivas (from October 12, to November 23, 
1989) and the ‘national unity’ government under Xenophon Zolotas in which New Democracy shared 
power with both PASOK and the Left (November 23, 1989 to April 11, 1990). In 1990, the ND party 
won the elections and formed a government under Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis. Period 
1990-1993 thus constitutes the return of New Democracy in Greek government. 
7
 The unallocated amount per capita of that period was €166.20. The total average public investment 
per capita was €366.50. 
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might be attributed to the political instability of the period 1989-90 and also to 
the limited administrative capacity of the country to absorb the European funds 
from the 1st Community Support Framework, which officially started in 1989.   
The regional spending pattern of that period shows remarkable stability 
between 1982-1989 and 1990-1993. Rank order correlation as high as .81 
reveals that the largest number of prefectures hold the similar position in the 
two rankings. Figure 4 and Table 3 present the main transitions in the relative 
positions of the prefectures regarding their participation in national per capita 
public investment during the period under study.  
What stands out immediately and evokes some surprise is that per capita 
investment in Attiki and Thessaloniki were not only far below average, but 
drifted further and further being among the lowest in the rankings. Attiki with 
€137,13 public spending per capita has experienced public investment below 
the national average by 32% and was ranked 47th, while Thessaloniki with 
€126,30 showed public investment below the national average by 35% and was 
ranked 49th. Only five prefectures had per capita public investment below 
those of Attiki, and only two below Thessaloniki. Thus, an even more 
substantial downgrading of Attiki –and Thessaloniki– is observed in the 
rankings in terms of participation in national per capita public investment. 
In contrast to the above, there were certain interesting developments in the top 
places in the ranking. Evrytania with €1000.38 expenditure per capita occupied 
the first position in the ranking with public investment five times greater than 
the country average, and seven times greater than those of Attiki. It is clear that 
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Evrytania benefits from the highest per-capita expenditures. Apart from the fact 
that Evrytania is one of the most sparsely-populated and mountainous 
prefectures, it was also the constituency of P. Bakoyannis, a politician who was 
assassinated by terrorists in 1989 and after that Evryatnia was the constituency 
of D. Bakoyanni, his spouse, who is also the daughter of the Prime Minister of 
that period Konstantinos Mitsotakis. Fokida with €663.1 public investment per 
capita holds the second place in the ranking, enjoying public support three 
times as high as the country average. Grevena with €588.4 holds the third place 
in the ranking and Samos with €513.31 occupies the fourth place. Ioannina, 
with €468.3 is placed fifth. These top five beneficiaries received public support 
at least two times above the national average. Apart from other reasons, 
political circumstances have played a role in this development. The majority of 
these beneficiaries are crucial electoral constituencies; they are single-seat and 
dual-seat prefectures. Due to the marginal majority, these constituencies 
became politically crucial for the elections. This fact probably influenced 
public investments positively, with the goal of gleaning a favourable vote from 
each respective government.  The intense political antagonism and tensions of 
the period brought additional resources to these prefectures. 
Figure 4. Transition Matrix - Changes in the pattern of public investment 
allocation: 1982-89 versus 1990-93 
1990-93 (column) 1982-89 
(row) 42-51 32-41 22-31 12-21 1-11 Total 
42-51 7 3    10 
32-41 2 3 4  1 10 
22-31 1 4 2 3  10 
12-21   3 3 4 10 
1-11   1 4 6 11 
Total 10 10 10 10 11 51 
Source: See Figure 1. 
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Table 3. Changes in the pattern of public investment allocation: 1990-93 versus 
1982-89: a selection of extreme cases. 
 NUTS III 1976-81 1982-89  
   R GR=100  R GR=100 diff 
gr124 Pella 243,42 26 114 177,72 40 89 -14 
gr433 Rethymni 454,61 4 214 335,80 18 168 -14 
gr242 Evvoia 227,65 30 107 174,60 43 87 -13 
gr421 Dodekanisos 327,12 14 154 253,64 27 127 -13 
gr432 Lasithi 350,00 11 165 284,17 23 142 -12 
gr111 Evros 426,45 5 200 340,43 16 170 -11 
gr223 Kefallinia 553,59 2 260 376,17 13 188 -11 
gr232 Achaia 237,84 27 112 182,91 38 91 -11 
gr255 Messinia 319,83 15 150 261,29 25 130 -10 
gr127 Chalkidiki 294,99 19 139 252,25 28 126 -9 
gr3 Attiki 174,86 43 82 137,13 47 68 -4 
N
eg
a
tiv
e 
gr122 Thessaloniki 148,04 47 70 126,30 49 63 -2 
gr254 Lakonia 197,93 38 93 206,08 32 103 6 
gr114 Drama 276,51 21 130 359,28 14 179 7 
gr125 Pieria 169,38 44 80 184,49 37 92 7 
gr434 Chania 304,03 17 143 430,98 9 215 8 
gr245 Fokida 343,65 12 162 663,11 2 331 10 
gr411 Lesvos 232,47 29 109 316,28 19 158 10 
gr231 Aitoloakarnania 204,39 35 96 269,49 24 135 11 
gr244 Fthiotida 142,10 49 67 198,40 34 99 15 
gr222 Kerkyra 179,30 40 84 305,30 22 152 18 
Po
sit
iv
e 
gr112 Xanthi 203,40 36 96 443,60 7 221 29 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
As previously stated important changes in the ranking should not be expected 
during the course of four-year period. As can be seen from the transition matrix 
21 out of 51 prefectures remain at the same quartile between the two periods. 
From the rest 15 were upgraded and 15 were downgraded. However, changes 
were mild. 
Nine prefectures moved down by 10 to 14 places in the ranking. Rethymni (by 
14 places), Lasithi, Dodekanisos and Messinia (by 12 places), Evvoia, 
Kefallinia and Evros (by 11 places), Achaia and Pella (by 10 places). In the 
same period, seven prefectures improved their position moving up at least 10 
places. The most substantial rise was by Xanthi (from 36th to 7th place, a change 
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of 29 places). Kerkyra’s transition (from 40th to 22nd place, a change of 18 
places) and that of Fthiotida (from 49th to 34th place, a change of 15 places) 
were also substantial. Aitoloakarnania rose by 11 places in the rankings, while 
Fokida, Lesvos and Chania rose by 10 places. Chania was the only prefecture 
in Kriti where public investment increased. Chania was the place of origin of 
the Prime Minister K. Mitsotakis.  
Figure 5. Scatter-plot of per capita public investment (1990-93) and GDP (1990) 
for Greek prefectures (Greece=100)    
 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
Thus, although there are no significant changes in the regional distribution of 
public investment between the current and the previous period, there were 
certain interesting cases. The intense political competition during this period 
resulted in the increase of investment in small and electoral decisive 
prefectures. Indeed, a large number of small, agricultural, border and 
mountainous prefectures, with a below-average level of economic 
development, received above-average per capita public investment. Despite the 
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fact that there were certain exceptions, the pattern of supporting the less-
developed prefectures was more apparent and marked during this period than in 
any of the preceding periods. Conversely, the most populated areas of Attiki 
and Thessaloniki drift further in the ranking. As a result of the above, a greater 
redistribution effect is observed at this period. 
Thus, as a general conclusion it may be said that from a redistribution 
perspective, this period’s policy was more redistributive than all those 
preceding it. Statistically, the inverse relationship is significant, especially 
when outliers are removed, and is stronger that in any previous period. This 
was to a great extent a result of the decline of Attiki’s relative position in the 
country’s public investment tables. This may also be related with the fact that 
many 1st CSF projects were small-scale and applied at a regional level. There 
might be also a case of inertia, especially for short periods of time. More 
recently, Mackay (2001: 570), observed an extremely high correlation between 
spending in different regions of the U.K. in succeeding years which led him to 
the conclusion that “History and habit, custom and practice have a powerful 
impact on public spending. There is inertia. Last year’s spending is an excellent 
guide to this year’s and this year’s to next year’s.” 
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3.4. Period 1994-2000, the return of Socialists8 
This period had the following characteristics. Firstly, the period was politically 
homogeneous, since after 1993 PASOK returned to government and remained 
in power throughout the period under study. This period also coincided with the 
implementation of the 2nd Community Support Framework (1994-1999). The 
larger part of the CSF and also funding from the Cohesion Fund was 
implemented through the Public Investments Budget. The principal aim of 
economic policy during this period was to meet the requirements, the 
convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, in order to secure the country’s 
participation to the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).9 The aim 
of this section is to present the regional distribution principle for public 
investments during this period. The analysis again yields very important 
findings. 
As shown in the Table Id, there was a sharp increase in per capita public 
investment spending during this period. Nationally, regionally allocated public 
investment per capita over the period 1994-2000 averaged €261.47, which 
constitutes an increase of 30%, compared to the preceding period 1990-1993.10 
The sharp increase in the total volume of public investment of that period can 
be attributed to the increased European funding from the second Community 
                                                 
8
 PASOK under Andreas Papandreou won the elections in 1993 and remained in power until 1996 
(from October 13, 1993 to January 22, 1996). His last term was disrupted by health and age, and finally 
stepped down as Prime Minister and leader of Pasok, and was succeeded by Costas Simitis (January 22, 
1996). Papandreou died on 23rd of June 1996. Pasok under Costas Simitis won the elections in 1996 
and 2000 having two consecutive terms in power (March 10, 2004 to April 9, 2000). 
9
 In 1998 eleven EU member-states had met the convergence criteria, and the Euro-zone came into 
existence with the official launch of the Euro on 1 January 1999. Greece qualified in 2000 and was 
admitted on 1 January 2001. 
10
 The unallocated amount per capita of that period was €248.40. The total average public investment 
per capita was €509.90. 
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Support Framework and the Cohesion Fund. However, this increase was also 
due to the transferring of funding from the European Social Fund and the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund-Guidance section, from 
the Current Expenditure Budget, to the Public Investment Budget. Up to year 
1996 these funds had been registered in the Current Expenditure Budget.11 
Having added new programmes in these data it is of some interest to consider 
the distributional consequences of this increase. 
The rank order correlation of .71 shows that there were not significant changes 
between 1990-1993 and 1994-2000. But comparing 1982-1989 and 1994-2000 
the coefficient correlation of .56 indicates that between the two decades 1980s 
and 1990s there are significant changes in the pattern, comparable to the 
changes between the 1970s and the 1980s. .   
The first point, as can be seen in Table 4, is that after more than a decade of 
constant decline, Attiki upgraded its position in the public investment rankings 
by 15 places, from 47th to 32nd place. Thessaloniki likewise rose by 9 places, 
from 49th to 40th. This increase in Attiki and Thessaloniki has catalytically 
affected the pattern of regional distribution for public investment during the 
period under study. It is clear that, during that period a transition to a more 
centralist system for the spatial distribution of public investments was taking 
place, leading to a new polarisation between the two large urban centres and 
the rest of the country.  
                                                 
11
 After the government legislation from the year 1996. 
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The tendency to strengthen the highly urbanised prefectures appears to be 
confirmed in the case of Achaia. This prefecture rose by 29 places and reached 
the 9th place from the 38th which it had occupied in the previous period. This 
development could probably be related to the fact that this prefecture possesses 
the third largest city in the country, Patras. In addition, the three 
aforementioned prefectures constitute the basic transport infrastructure nodes in 
the country, and were given high priority by the 2nd Community Support 
Framework 1994-1999. Achaia, Attiki and Thessaloniki are the principal nodes 
in the Patra-Athens-Thessaloniki-Evzoni (P.A.TH.E.) axis. On these grounds, it 
is clear why the prefecture of Fthiotida was strengthened and upgraded 
significantly from 34th to 7th place, moved up by 27 places. Ileia, Chalkidiki 
and Evros were also upgraded. Chalkidiki was also the area of origin of the 
Deputy Minister of the Economy Chr. Pahta, responsible for the management 
of CSF resources. Pieria probably owes its upgrading to the fact that it is on the 
P.A.TH.E. axis.  
Voiotia showed a decline in its relative position by 32 places, probably because 
certain road infrastructures were completed. Fokida also showed a large 
decline. Ioannina and Messinia, Karditsa, Xanthi, Evrytania, Pella and Lakonia 
followed suit. The cases of increases in public investment were more numerous 
and interesting. The three most urbanized departments –Achaia, Attiki and 
Thessaloniki– were upgraded. The prefectures along the PATHE axis, such as 
Fthiotida and Magnisia were also upgraded. Three formerly agricultural 
prefectures which experienced significant support in the 1970s –Evros, 
Chalkidiki and Ileia– began to enjoy significant support again. Rodopi, in 
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Northern Greece, rose from 26th to 12th place. It appears that we have come full 
circle so that in the 1990s we had returned to a regional distribution principle 
for public investments reminiscent of that of the 1970s. 
Figure 6. Transition Matrix-Changes in the pattern of public investment 
allocation: 1990-93 versus 1994-00 
1994-2000 (column) 1990-93 
(row) 42-51 32-41 22-31 12-21 1-11 Total 
42-51 6 4    10 
32-41 3 2 3  2 10 
22-31 1 2 3 4  10 
12-21  1 2 5 2 10 
1-11  1 2 1 7 11 
Total 10 10 10 10 11 51 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
Table 4. Changes in the pattern of public investment allocation: 1990-93 versus 
1994-2000: a selection of extreme cases 
 NUTS III 1976-81 1982-89  
   R GR=100  R GR=100 diff 
gr241 Voiotia 443,80 6 222 205,81 38 79 -32 
gr255 Messinia 261,29 25 130 180,54 44 69 -19 
gr112 Xanthi 443,60 7 221 290,07 25 111 -18 
gr141 Karditsa 307,36 21 153 225,57 37 86 -16 
gr213 Ioannina 468,33 5 234 321,95 20 123 -15 
gr413 Chios 415,73 11 207 309,37 22 118 -11 
gr433 Rethymni 335,80 18 168 275,83 29 105 -11 
gr114 Drama 359,28 14 179 293,34 24 112 -10 
gr254 Lakonia 206,08 32 103 186,49 42 71 -10 
N
eg
a
tiv
e 
gr432 Lasithi 284,17 23 142 240,87 33 92 -10 
gr122 Thessaloniki 126,30 49 63 200,19 40 77 9 
gr125 Pieria 184,49 37 92 285,35 28 109 9 
gr134 Florina 211,09 30 105 320,00 21 122 9 
gr252 Arkadia 188,18 36 94 288,49 27 110 9 
gr113 Rodopi 259,57 26 130 374,20 12 143 14 
gr127 Chalkidiki 252,25 28 126 367,74 14 141 14 
gr3 Attiki 137,13 47 68 254,12 32 97 15 
gr233 Ileia 118,33 50 59 238,51 34 91 16 
gr244 Fthiotida 198,40 34 99 447,24 7 171 27 
Po
sit
iv
e 
gr232 Achaia 182,91 38 91 414,51 9 159 29 
Source: See Figure 1. 
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Summing up it can be observed that during the 1990s the Socialist governments 
followed a pattern that favoured the most populated areas and prefectures on 
the main road corridors of the country. Most probably this was influenced by 
the large scale infrastructure projects financed by the Community Support 
Framework 1994-1999 whose aim was to upgrade the country’s main 
infrastructures. Attiki and Thessaloniki received a substantial amount of public 
investment per capita and this was a catalyst for the pattern of public 
investment allocation of this period. Other than that, however, allocation 
became more redistributive in this period, as can be depicted from the scatter-
diagram of Figure 7.  
Figure 7. Scatter-plot of per capita public investment (1994-00) and GDP (1994) 
for Greek prefectures (Greece=100)    
 
Source: See Figure 1. 
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3.5. Period 2001-2004, the Olympic Games period 
This is the period for the preparation of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. It 
was anticipated that Olympic Projects would have affected not only the total 
magnitude of public investment in the country but also the pattern for regional 
allocation of public expenditure. The 2004 Olympic Games were going to be 
primarily hosted in Greater Athens, a metropolitan region that already 
disproportionably accounts for most economic activity in Greece. Further 
polarization was expected as a result of preparing the region for the games. A 
widespread consensus on this has led to policy initiatives and actions aiming to 
countervail spatial unevenness in propelling development. Indeed, this 
sensitivity to spatial asymmetry of the effects of preparing and hosting the 
games seems to be uniquely characterizing Greek organizing authorities. The 
preparations for such enormous and costly events can lead to a distortion in 
spatial dispersion of national wealth, by benefiting disproportionately selective 
places against the needs of the other.  
There are many interesting conclusions that can be derived from the analysis. 
Let us start for the mere observation that total volume of public investment 
during that period increased dramatically. In per capita terms the average 
amount was €424.19, an unprecedented increase throughout the 30-year study 
period. Undoubtedly, the most striking of the several facts is that 55,6% of the 
total (€10.321million) was invested in Attiki. Attiki with €661.89 public 
investment per capita was ranked 3rd. Another important feature is that only 
ten prefectures appreciated public investment above the country’s average. The 
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remaining 41 prefectures received below average expenditure support. 
However, in absolute terms, a large number of prefectures received substantial 
support during the period of the Olympic Games, probably through the Greece 
2004 programme, which was aiming to finance infrastructures throughout 
Greece.  
The rank order correlation 0.709 reveals that the ranking hasn’t changed 
dramatically. The transition matrix and Table 5 report the changes in the 
relative position of the prefectures.  
As it stated above the most striking case was that of Attiki, which was 
upgraded by 29 places, from the 32nd to the 3rd place in the ranking. Irakleio 
escalated to the 13th from the 41st place and gained 28 places. Irakleio, the 
capital city of the prefecture, was one of the four Olympic Cities, the cities of 
Thessaloniki, Volos, Patra and Irakleion, were going to host football games at 
the qualifiers-stage. This most probably explains the fact that Magnessia, the 
prefecture with the capital city of Volos, has been upgraded by 19 places in the 
ranking. The same applies to Thessaloniki, as well as to Ileia, the place of birth 
of the Olympic Games. Korinthia, the adjacent prefecture to Attiki has also an 
impressive progress reaching the 21st from the 48th place.    
On the other extreme Preveza droped by 20 places from 4th to the 24th and 
Chania fall by 19 places, from 11th to 30th. There was also a reduction in 
relative position for the prefectures of Evros, Kavala, Xanthi, Rodopi, all 
belonging to East Macedonia and Thrace region.  
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Figure 8. Transition Matrix-Changes in the pattern of public investment 
allocation: 1994-2000 versus 2001-04 
2001-2004 (column) 1994-2000 
(row) 42-51 32-41 22-31 12-21 1-11 Total 
42-51 7 2  1  10 
32-41 3 3 2 1 1 10 
22-31  5 1 4  10 
12-21   4 2 4 10 
1-11   3 2 6 11 
Total 10 10 10 10 11 51 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
Table 5. Changes in the pattern of public investment allocation: 1994-2000 
versus 2001-2004: a selection of extreme cases. 
 NUTS III 1976-81 1982-89  
   R GR=100  R GR=100 diff 
gr214 Preveza 544,99 4 208 340,39 24 80 -20 
gr434 Chania 397,17 11 152 293,78 30 69 -19 
gr111 Evros 412,86 10 158 330,17 27 78 -17 
gr115 Kavala 288,93 26 111 186,82 41 44 -15 
gr112 Xanthi 290,07 25 111 188,85 39 45 -14 
gr113 Rodopi 374,20 12 143 331,99 26 78 -14 
gr231 Aitoloakarnania 355,22 17 136 322,59 28 76 -11 
gr211 Arta 237,01 35 91 165,50 45 39 -10 
gr114 Drama 293,34 24 112 242,77 33 57 -9 
N
eg
a
tiv
e 
gr232 Achaia 414,51 9 159 370,34 18 87 -9 
gr422 Kyklades 343,84 18 132 420,16 11 99 7 
gr122 Thessaloniki 200,19 40 77 253,97 32 60 8 
gr125 Pieria 285,35 28 109 355,91 20 84 8 
gr233 Ileia 238,51 34 91 335,09 25 79 9 
gr142 Larisa 139,11 50 53 187,09 40 44 10 
gr213 Ioannina 321,95 20 123 488,55 8 115 12 
gr143 Magnisia 263,71 31 101 413,05 12 97 19 
gr253 Korinthia 157,33 48 60 352,01 21 83 27 
Po
sit
iv
e 
gr431 Irakleio 194,90 41 75 411,77 13 97 28 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
In sum, the Olympic Games period has caused an unprecedented increase in 
public investment. Attiki experienced a tremendous increase in the volume of 
public investment. A distortion in the regional allocation of public investment 
was occurred. Despite the absence of any clear pattern, the positive sign for the 
correlation coefficient indicates that there is a positive relationship between 
level of economic development and the support that prefectures receive. This 
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results in broadening the gap between the most prosperous and the less 
developed areas of the country. 
Figure 9. Scatter-plot of per capita public investment (2001-04) and GDP (2000) 
for Greek prefectures (Greece=100)   
 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
 
 
4. Overview and conclusions 
The main aim of this paper was to shed light into an under-researched area of 
modern public policy in Greece namely the geographical pattern of public 
spending. Tracing public investment over a 30-year period is not at all a 
straightforward issue.  
This paper represents a great effort to construct one of the longest time series 
with public investment data ever presented in the literature. This is the most 
consistent dataset that has ever been constructed on regional spending in 
Greece. Unpublished data on public investment have been collected from a 
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single official source, guaranteeing consistency. Public investment is expressed 
in EURO and at constant 2000 prices. The sub-periods are constructed 
according to the duration of each government in office. Although a 
government’s decision in a set period may have influenced the payment made 
by another in the following period, the aggregate sums based on a number of 
years smoothens the trends and gives more plausible results. Having tackled 
these issues, analysis showed that striking variation exists in the regional 
allocation of public investment. However, the mere fact of regional variations 
in per capita public investment is insufficient evidence for judging whether the 
observed distribution has been ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. The benefit of this paper is 
that it presents systematically the pattern of public investment allocation in 
Greece over a long period providing a baseline for further research. 
Analysis showed, first, that there are marked inequalities in the flows of public 
investment across the Greek prefectures. However, there is not a ‘clear’ pattern 
for the regional dispersion of public investment in Greece. Neither a North-
South/Mainland-Island/Urban-Rural divide nor ‘the needs based approach’ 
could carry sufficient explanation for the allocation of public investment. 
Analysis by period showed that the picture for the regional allocation of public 
investment is rather ‘patchy’.  
Second, contrary to what many researchers have portrayed about history and 
inertia for the stability of the devolved spending in the UK (Mackay and 
Williams 2005: 819,826) and ‘the remarkable stability’ of regional spending 
pattern in the USA (Anton 1982:430) the regional allocation of public 
investment in Greece is changing over time. The rank order correlations ‘as 
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high as .98, .94 and .98 for the past three decades’ for the USA (ibid, 430) and 
the .995 and .965 for the UK have no comparison with .54, .70 and .70 between 
the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s in Greece (Table 6). The most important 
changes came about at two different times: between the 1970s and the 1980s 
and between the 1990s and the early 2000s. The first change between the 1970s 
and 1980s could be attributed to differences between Conservative and 
Socialist government policies. The changes between the 1990s and early 2000s 
could be attributed to the Olympic Games. Both had a tremendous influence on 
the spatial dispersion of public investment but in the opposite direction; the 
former towards higher dispersion and the latter towards higher concentration. 
Third, the level of underdevelopment - and as result redistribution - does not 
appear to have constantly and systematically comprised the principal criterion 
to explaining the regional pattern of resource allocation in Greece during the 
period 1976-2005. When looking at the overall pattern, one might expect that 
the lower the level of prosperity, the higher the level of public expenditure. 
Quite strikingly, however, a large number of lagging behind prefectures in 
economic development terms had received below-average public investment. 
This omission was one of the most important findings of the analysis.  
Fourth, the policy followed throughout the study period concerning the regional 
distribution of public investment does not seem to have been dictated by a 
higher-level strategic regional development plan. For this to have been the case, 
the government should have systematically monitored and recorded the public 
capital balance by prefecture, noted potential gaps, omissions, inequalities and 
needs, and distributed resources accordingly. Sadly, this has not been the case. 
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In contrast, the regional distribution of public investment seems to be dictated 
more by faltering, ad hoc interventions based on opportunistic and some times 
politically myopic criteria, rather than by coordinated interventions dictated by 
some well-researched plan of recorded needs.     
Table 6. Rank order correlation of public investment distribution between 
political periods 
Period 1976-81 1982-89 1990-93 1994-00 2001-04 1976-05 
1976-81 1.000 0.564 0.429 0.372 0.229 0.578 
1982-89  1.000 0.811 0.565 0.277 0.790 
1990-93   1.000 0.715 0.376 0.874 
1994-00    1.000 0.709 0.862 
2001-04     1.000 0.664 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
Table 7: Summary statistics of public investment regional distribution by period 
PERIOD 1976-81 1982-89 1990-93 1994-00 2001-04 
Maximum 467,816 714,372 1,006,379 621,367 863,966 
Minimum 85,016 135,498 111,059 132,449 104,561 
Max/min ratio 5.5 5.3 9.1 4.7 8.3 
Regional average 190,049 274,423 296,454 305,509 331,863 
Standard deviation 83,362 116,485 162,853 120,960 159,117 
Coefficient of variation 0.439 0.424 0.549 0.396 0.479 
CoV weighted 0.368 0.369 0.480 0.301 0.666 
National average 191,946 212,729 200,359 261,466 424,187 
Standard deviation 83,384 132,102 189,579 128,879 184,424 
Coefficient of variation 0.434 0.621 0.946 0.493 0.435 
CoV weighted 0.364 0.377 0.524 0.308 0.473 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
Last but not least, the regional distribution of public investment seems to be 
affected by electoral geography. The electoral preferences of prefectures, even 
the place of origin of certain members of each government, seem to comprise 
explanatory variables for the regional distribution of public investment. This is 
consistent with what Mackay and Williams state (Mackay and Williams, 2005: 
819) that explaining the pattern ‘great weight has to be given to political 
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influences’. Obviously this conclusion requires additional evidence, and cannot 
be generalised nor substitute for other factors, which in conjunction with it, 
contribute to a better understanding of the regional distribution of public 
investment in Greece. 
Figure 10. Spatial distribution of Public Investment per capita and Public 
Investment in absolute values, 1976-2005 
 
Source: See Figure 1. 
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Appendix 
 
Tables IA-IF. Regional distribution of regionally allocated public investment per 
capita over the period 1976-2005 and sub-periods (in €, at constant 2000 prices) 
(top 10, bottom 10, Attiki and Thessaloniki) 
(IA)      (IB)       
NUTS III 1976-81      NUTS III 1982-89     
    R GR=100      R GR=100 
gr111 Evros 467.82 1 244  gr243 Evrytania 714.37 1 336 
gr243 Evrytania 388.88 2 203  gr223 Kefallinia 553.59 2 260 
gr126 Serres 387.62 3 202  gr241 Voiotia 491.11 3 231 
gr233 Ileia 357.11 4 186  gr433 Rethymni 454.61 4 214 
gr213 Ioannina 294.48 5 153  gr111 Evros 426.45 5 200 
gr241 Voiotia 288.01 6 150  gr412 Samos 412.57 6 194 
gr124 Pella 282.05 7 147  gr213 Ioannina 396.08 7 186 
gr131 Grevena 269.99 8 141  gr224 Lefkada 391.51 8 184 
gr214 Preveza 263.80 9 137  gr131 Grevena 382.73 9 180 
gr412 Samos 237.80 10 124  gr212 Thesprotia 350.85 10 165 
gr3 Attiki 211.79 16 110          
gr122 Thessaloniki 169.69354 27 88          
gr252 Arkadia 122.05 41 64  gr144 Trikala 175.23 41 82 
gr242 Evvoia 115.05 42 60  gr143 Magnisia 175.21 42 82 
gr211 Arta 113.28 43 59  gr3 Attiki 174.86 43 82 
gr222 Kerkyra 112.55 44 59  gr125 Pieria 169.38 44 80 
gr125 Pieria 109.89 45 57  gr142 Larisa 162.38 45 76 
gr121 Imathia 103.13 46 54  gr126 Serres 155.72 46 73 
gr244 Fthiotida 101.25 47 53  gr122 Thes/niki 148.04 47 70 
gr141 Karditsa 100.17 48 52  gr121 Imathia 142.83 48 67 
gr133 Kozani 98.82 49 51  gr244 Fthiotida 142.10 49 67 
gr142 Larisa 94.79 50 49  gr253 Korinthia 138.48 50 65 
gr144 Trikala 85.02 51 44  gr233 Ileia 135.50 51 64 
         
Total 191.95   100  Total 212.73   100 
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(IC) 
    (ID)    
NUTS III 1990-93     NUTS III 1994-00     
  GR=100   R      R GR=100 
gr243 Evrytania 1,006.38 1 502  gr212Thesprotia 621.37 1 238 
gr245 Fokida 663.11 2 331  gr243 Evrytania 613.62 2 235 
gr131 Grevena 588.42 3 294  gr131 Grevena 548.98 3 210 
gr412 Samos 513.31 4 256  gr214 Preveza 544.99 4 208 
gr213 Ioannina 468.33 5 234  gr224 Lefkada 467.14 5 179 
gr241 Voiotia 443.80 6 222  gr412 Samos 453.24 6 173 
gr112 Xanthi 443.60 7 221  gr244 Fthiotida 447.24 7 171 
gr212 Thesprotia 437.81 8 219  gr245 Fokida 427.62 8 164 
gr434 Chania 430.98 9 215  gr232 Achaia 414.51 9 159 
gr214 Preveza 424.36 10 212  gr111 Evros 412.86 10 158 
         gr3 Attiki 254.12 32 97 
         gr122 Thes/niki 200.19 40 77 
gr133 Kozani 175.83 41 88  gr431 Irakleio 194.90 41 75 
gr144 Trikala 175.57 42 88  gr254 Lakonia 186.49 42 71 
gr242 Evvoia 174.60 43 87  gr251 Argolida 185.09 43 71 
gr123 Kilkis 153.41 44 77  gr255 Messinia 180.54 44 69 
gr142 Larisa 146.58 45 73  gr242 Evvoia 173.10 45 66 
gr126 Serres 144.24 46 72  gr126 Serres 168.78 46 65 
gr3 Attiki 137.13 47 68  gr144 Trikala 158.71 47 61 
gr121 Imathia 129.97 48 65  gr253 Korinthia 157.33 48 60 
gr122 Thes/niki 126.30 49 63  gr124 Pella 150.68 49 58 
gr233 Ileia 118.33 50 59  gr142 Larisa 139.11 50 53 
gr253 Korinthia 111.06 51 55  gr121 Imathia 132.45 51 51 
         
Total 100 200.36    Total 261.47   100 
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(IE)     (IF)    
NUTS III 2001-04      NUTS III 1976-05    
  
  R GR=100    GR=100   R 
gr131 Grevena 863.97 1 204  gr243 Evrytania 697.03 1 297 
gr224 Lefkada 672.47 2 159  gr131 Grevena 626.30 2 267 
gr3 Attiki 661.89 3 156  
gr212 
Thesprotia 437.59 3 186 
gr212 Thesprotia 634.05 4 149  gr412 Samos 412.83 4 176 
gr412 Samos 546.18 5 129  gr224 Lefkada 402.61 5 171 
gr244 Fthiotida 526.49 6 124  gr111 Evros 394.47 6 168 
gr127 Chalkidiki 511.29 7 121  gr245 Fokida 390.09 7 166 
gr213 Ioannina 488.55 8 115  gr214 Preveza 380.32 8 162 
gr221 Zakynthos 432.27 9 102  gr223 Kefallinia 349.02 9 149 
gr243 Evrytania 428.39 10 101  gr213 Ioannina 348.00 10 148 
gr122 Thes/niki 253.97 32 60  gr3 Attiki 247.85 29 105 
                 
gr115 Kavala 186.82 41 44  gr251 Argolida 191.80 41 82 
gr123 Kilkis 180.37 42 43  gr133 Kozani 189.39 42 81 
gr254 Lakonia 180.27 43 42  gr124 Pella 187.88 43 80 
gr144 Trikala 175.49 44 41  gr254 Lakonia 178.05 44 76 
gr211 Arta 165.50 45 39  gr123 Kilkis 169.35 45 72 
gr242 Evvoia 164.50 46 39  gr242 Evvoia 169.14 46 72 
gr241 Voiotia 162.49 47 38  gr253 Korinthia 163.92 47 70 
gr126 Serres 142.01 48 33  gr144 Trikala 162.51 48 69 
gr124 Pella 113.30 49 27  
gr122 
Thessaloniki 160.10 49 68 
gr255 Messinia 109.97 50 26  gr142 Larisa 140.10 50 60 
gr121 Imathia 104.56 51 25  gr121 Imathia 118.61 51 50 
         
Total 424.19   100  Total 100 235.01   
Source: See Figure 1. 
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